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ABSTRACT: Historical and moral consciousness have been studied by specialists in history 
education and social psychology, respectively, yet the two fields of study have remained separate 
also when they share an interest in the dynamics of how people respond to moral dilemmas, 
process them and create morally meaningful narratives of human conduct. This article seeks to 
identify concepts and interpretative frames that could be mobilised in analyses of shared material 
for the purpose of developing deeper understanding of the intersections of historical and moral 
consciousness in exchange between history education and social psychology. One of the authors 
has researched moral reasoning and moral sensitivity, the other has researched adolescents’ 
historical consciousness. The empirical material was collected in 2008–2009, in a study of how 
Finnish upper secondary school students reason about transgenerational responsibility and 
reparation. How the students process and negotiate these issues was initially analysed as a 
manifestation of their historical consciousness. This article explores what approaches and concepts 
could be relevant when analysing the material in the framework of a social-psychological study of 
morality. The article is also an exercise in co-authoring where the authors have produced the text 
in dialogic exchange, writing one chapter each in turn and responding to each other’s ideas. 
KEYWORDS: historical consciousness, moral consciousness, moral psychology, history education, 
moral education, focus groups.  
Introduction 
Historical consciousness and moral consciousness (the latter concept pertaining here to the 
complex of elements relating to moral sensitivity; see also Introduction to the special issue) 
have been extensively theorised and empirically studied by specialists of history education 
and social psychology, respectively. Yet the two fields of study remain largely alien to each 
other, despite a coinciding interest in questions of how people process moral dilemmas and 
create morally meaningful narratives of human conduct. This article seeks to identify concepts 
and interpretative frames in the study of historical and moral consciousness that can be 
mobilised and fruitfully married in future analyses of shared empirical material for the 
purpose of developing a deeper understanding of the intersections between historical and 
moral consciousness. It can be read as an exercise in multidisciplinary study, however one can 
argue that constructing bridges between historical and moral consciousness should preferably 
go deeper into the crossdisciplinary or interdisciplinary level so as to better grasp the 
complexity of the topic. However, we hope this article will serve as a step along the path, 
showing openings and hesitations that come up in exchanges between two disciplines.   
Jan Löfström has researched adolescents’ historical consciousness and Liisa Myyry has 
done social-psychological research on moral judgment, moral sensitivity and moral 
motivation. The material discussed in the article was collected by Jan Löfström in 2008–2009, 
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in a focus group study of how Finnish upper secondary school students reason about issues of 
transgenerational responsibility and historical reparations. How the students processed and 
negotiated these issues was seen as manifestations of their historical consciousness. This 
article explores what approaches and concepts could be relevant and rewarding when 
analysing the focus group material in the framework of a social-psychological study of 
morality, bringing a fresh view on the project that was initially hinged upon other conceptual 
premises. 
The article is a co-authoring exercise where the contributions from the authors are in 
dialogic exchange. At first Jan Löfström describes the aims and the outcomes of his study. 
Liisa Myyry then discusses, from the perspective of social psychology, what conceptual 
approaches could be relevant and fruitful in analysing these focus groups. In the following 
chapter Löfström ponders upon these suggestions and the questions they raise, and in chapter 
four Myyry responds to those reflections. The final words present some concluding remarks 
on how the focus group might have been modified in the direction of integrating the study of 
historical and moral consciousness more closely. 
Starting point: studying adolescents’ moral consciousness via their reasoning on 
historical responsibility 
The research project on Finnish adolescents’ reflections on historical responsibility and 
historical reparation, launched, in 2008, was propelled by the observation that issues of 
transgenerational responsibility and reparation were prominent in the global scale but there 
was next to no research on how people reason about transgenerational responsibility and see 
the meanings of historical reparation. Reconcilliating historical conflicts through history 
education has now become a topic of numerous educational initiatives (e.g. Han et al. (eds), 
2012; Korostelina & Lässig (eds), 2013), the political, philosophical and judicial dimensions 
of historical reparations have been extensively studied (e.g. Barkan 2001; Elster 2004; 
Freeman et al. 2006; Nobles 2008; Thompson 2002; Torpey 2006; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2009; 
Gibney et al. (eds) 2008), yet people’s reflections on the rationale and justification of 
historical reparations still remain very much unexplored as they did also ten years ago.  
Questions relating to the treatment of historical injustices are, for example, who if any was 
accountable for the unjust actions in the past, who has a moral right to speak on behalf of the 
perpetrators and the victims of past injustices now, and can people of a distant past be judged 
by today’s moral standards, and on what premises? As people discuss these questions they 
express what kind of narratives of historical change and continuity they are predisposed to 
construct. For example, do people readily think of the past, the present and the future as 
connected by continuities or rather that they are separated by discontinuities? In the first 
alternative they may more willingly say that there is transgenerational moral responsibility, 
for example.  
Perceptions of continuity and discontinuity lie at the heart of historical consciousness, a 
basic human disposition that one’s interpretations of the past, expectations about the future 
and perceptions of the present inform and feed into each other (see, for example, Seixas (ed.), 
2004.) It has also been suggested, notably by Jörn Rüsen (2004), that historical consciousness 
is a kind of narrative competence, ability to generate interpretations of the world where there 
are meaningful interrelations between the past, the present and the future. Rüsen’s theory of 
various types of narratives implies some differentiation between more and less developed 
narratives but it does not give an explicit hierarchy of the types. Historical consciousness has 
been theorised by a number of scholars but Jörn Rüsen can be pointed out as a theorist with 
explicit interest in the moral element of historical consciousness. He has argued that in the 
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narratives of historical change and continuity that people generate there is a moral dimension 
involved in that these narratives are stories about right and wrong. In other words people are 
predisposed to give history moral meanings. (See Rüsen, 2005; Ammert 2015.) In that respect 
moral consciousness is inextricably intertwined with historical consciousness. 
In moral psychology moral consciousness, or moral sensitivity, could be defined as an 
awareness of how our actions affect other people immediately and in long-term (Rest, 1986). 
Moral sensitivity requires the ability to take the other’s viewpoint, and cognition and affect 
are interconnected in moral sensitivity in role-taking and feeling the so called moral emotions, 
such as empathy, guilt and shame. Although through decades cognition was the main focus of 
moral research, in recent years the focus has shifted more and more to the role of emotions in 
moral consciousness and behavior (Hoffman, 2000; Lickel et al., 2005; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 
2009). It seems that the emotional part of morality also help us to interpret the moral 
meanings people give to historical narratives. 
Research on adolescent historical consciousness can contribute to the development of 
history teaching if it helps teachers and teacher educators to understand how students connect 
the ’layers’ of time and situate themselves in the fabric of temporal relations. A deeper 
knowledge of this may help teachers to better design history classes so that students 
experience the study of history as relevant and rewarding to their lives. This was also the 
rationale of the study of Finnish adolescents’ historical consciousness as it started. 
The Finnish research project was based on focus group interviews of fifty-three 17–18-year 
old upper secondary school students (28 boys, 25 girls). In every group there were three to 
four interviewees, recruited on a voluntary basis. The focus groups took place in eight 
different schools in Southern and Central Finland. The justification for using focus groups 
was to get a view of how adolescents collectively ponder on the issues of transgenerational 
responsibility. For example, what arguments would they spontaneously find more intelligible 
or unintelligible, more justified or unjustified, and how would they negotiate between the 
potentially dissenting voices within the group? The important thing for the researcher here is 
not the frequency of particular interpretations but rather how readily interpretations are given, 
how articulated they are, and how diversely they are negotiated during the discussion (for 
more details about the methodology, see Löfström, 2014.) 
The focus group interviews focused on four large themes which were: Can injustices of the 
past be repaired trans-generationally? Who can make historical reparations, and to whom? 
What could be the best way of repairing an historical injustice? Why have apologies for 
historical injustices become so frequent? Within the main themes other related issues were 
also addressed, like for example the possibility of official acts of forgiving. Some of the 
questions were posed at a general level and some at the level of concrete historical cases, like 
for example violence in the Finnish Civil War 1918 or the deportation of Jewish exiles from 
Finland during WW II. The interview frame included following items; note that the questions 
were not always posed in the same order or in the same format.  
– When speaking of the Finnish Winter War 1939–1940, or the Civil War 1918, how 
much do you speak of ‘us’ or think in terms of what ‘we’ did? How do you find the 
idea of being part of a chain that binds together many generations? 
– What episodes of Finnish history do you perhaps feel proud or ashamed of, and 
why? 
– Who were the guilty ones in 1918 and of what?  
– What were the morally bad things that happened in 1918 and how might they be 
repaired now, if at all?  
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– What do you think of the Finnish state apologizig to the former Red orphans? 
– What do you think of the idea that developing countries should get reparation from 
the Western countries for the time of colonialism? 
– What do you think of the apology of the then Finnish Prime Minister Paavo 
Lipponen, in 2000, at the monument for eight Jewish exiles who were handed over to 
Germans in 1942, and what other ways could there have be for dealing with the 1942 
deportation?  
– What do you think of the Prime Minister apologizing on behalf of all the (Finnish) 
people, and how much do you think his words obligate you morally?  
– How should one define the group “all the Finnish people” that the Prime Minister 
referred to? 
– Why do you think apologies for past injustices have become more numerous?  
– How do you find the idea of repairing historical injustices with money rather than 
apologies, and in what circumstances might one or the other alternative be more 
compelling? 
– What do you think of historical wrongs being forgiven officially? 
– What do you think of the claim that there is moral progress in the history or that 
historical research can adjudicate who did right and wrong in the past? 
In the transcribed interviews passages were coded and categorized with the key words like 
historical continuity/discontinuity, individual/collective responsibility, and ethical 
relativism/universalism, so as to identify what issue(s) the students were discussing at that 
point and what arguments they were making. A more detailed grid was then used for sorting 
out the diversity of motivations and justifications for or against particular notions and 
interpretations. 
An example of the material is the following excerpt from the transcription of one of the 
groups. Four students (F22, F23, F24, M26) and the interviewer Q are discussing the 
possibility of transgenerational reparations: 
F23: I think what happened then [in Finland 1918] has happened, one can’t repair it 
because the people are different now. 
F22: Yes, one can’t repair it anymore. 
F23: Yes. 
F22: It won’t make things better to anyone anymore. 
F23: For example, I couldn’t apologize to someone for what my grandfather has done 
because it is not my concern. It is really difficult to apologize when those people are 
no longer alive. 
F22: Yes, and those who made the decisions then have been dead for a long time now, 
in that sense it really is impossible to repair it to anyone anymore. 
[Q: Could the Government today apologize to those who became orphans when their 
Red parents were killed in 1918, for example?] 
F22: It doesn’t sound sensible because surely there were orphans also on the White 
side. I don’t somehow... 
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F24: It is such a remote thing anyway. If you think of those orphans, surely some of 
them are also already dead. 
F22: True. 
F23: Sure it is sad there are these orphans, and they would like to think that someone 
is accountable for their being orphans, but I can’t see how they can expect someone 
will come and apologize now. 
M26: I think the state is now the same as in 1918 also when those in power, of course, 
have changed dozens of times. And when you think there were obvious war crimes [in 
1918] afterwards, like executions of thousands of prisoners, and especially you know 
your relatives carried out executions, you would like someone to apologize. You feel a 
little ashamed of what the relatives did on the White side. 
F24: Yes, perhaps it would also clear the air if it was openly talked about. Maybe not 
blame anyone because who is there to blame anymore, but one would openly speak of 
it. It could perhaps make it easier for the nation to get over it and [it] would not be a 
taboo anymore. 
F22: True. 
F24: It might be good that at least somebody would say something about it. 
The students in all the focus groups would readily generate arguments in support of the view 
that since the perpetrators and victims of past unjust acts are no more alive, transgenerational 
responsibility to reparation does not exist. The idea of there being a rupture between the past 
and the present seemed intelligible and compelling to them. However in the excerpt above 
M26 challenged this view and told about his feeling of ‘vicarious shame’ and this led to the 
fellow students F22 and F24 acknowledging that feelings of transgenerational shame and guilt 
may exist and that symbolic reparations like apologies may be genuinely important to those 
concerned. 
The students in the groups would spontaneously subscribe to an individualist notion of 
moral responsibility: you are only accountable for what you personally do, thus it does not 
make sense to speak of a moral obligation to amend for the deeds of earlier generations. This 
view, however, would be modified and the plausibility of historical responsibility would be 
judged more favourably if the students came to discuss some cases where the 
transgenerational legacy of the past was more directly visible, like in the material 
consequences of colonialism. The proliferation of institutional apologies for historical 
injustices was mostly explained by the students so that apologies serve strategic interests of 
the apologizing states by bringing to them good-will and political and other advantages. 
Victims’ needs and victims’ role in demanding for reparations mostly did not come up in the 
groups. The students would readily say that historical apologies can remind us all of the 
tragedies of the past and they can serve as signals of good-will on the part of those who 
apologize, yet the benefits of apologies to the victims were apparently difficult for the 
students to imagine. 
The students’ responses can be seen as manifestations of what Jörn Rüsen (2005) has 
called exemplary and critical types of historical consciousness: the students agreed among 
themselves that history can give moral recommendations but they also questioned historical 
continuity and transgenerational identification. As we noted, in Rüsen’s theory there is an 
implicit hierarchy of types of historical consciousness. The Finnish project, however, was not 
geared towards differentiating between the various ’levels’ of historical consciousness but 
identifying what difficulties the students have when considering potential interconnections 
and interdependencies between the past, the present and the future.  
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The key concepts in the research project were drawn from the theory of history and history 
education. What can this focus group material offer to a social-psychological study of moral 
judgment and moral motivation? What concepts or perspectives could be fruitful to consider 
in that context, and what could be interesting to analyse in the ‘moral consciousness’ of the 
students, from the point of view of social psychology? 
Useful social-psychological concepts for studying adolescents’ moral consciousness: 
group identification and intergroup relations 
As mentioned above, moral consciousness, or moral sensitivity, refers to an awareness of how 
our actions affect other people immediately and in long-term (Rest, 1986). It includes being 
aware of who are the concerned parties in the situation, what lines of action are possible, and 
what may be the consequences of different behaviours to different parties. Who the 
protagonist perceives as being ‘others’ in a specific situation also depends on who is included 
in her/his moral universe. Inclusiveness of the moral universe refers to the breadth of the 
community to which people apply moral values and rules of fairness (Schwartz, 2007). Moral 
sensitivity requires both cognition and affect, such as empathy, which is prone to motivate us 
to behave morally (Hoffman, 2000; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 2009). Empathy is also seen to be the 
base for guilt. According to Hoffman (2000), guilt is characterized by tension and regret that 
arise when the person feels empathy for the victim and understands that she/he is responsible 
for the victim’s distress. Empathy may not have been a key concept in cognitive 
developmental moral theories of justice reasoning, but it has long been studied as a motivator 
of moral behavior (for example, Stotland 1969; Hoffman 1981). 
In recent years the concept of collective guilt has become an increasingly popular research 
topic in social psychology. Collective guilt is an emotion that arises mainly when group 
members perceive that they have some responsibility for, or control over, their in-group’s 
wrongdoings or the possible consequences of those wrongdoings (see, for example, Lickel et 
al., 2005). Feeling collective guilt is thus related to group membership and to the constellation 
between in-group versus outgroup. In the case of historical injustices that were encountered in 
Finland in the Civil War 1918 or in WW II, for instance, group identity in particular may be 
activated. There are two cognitive processes going on in transforming group membership into 
group identity. Categorization takes place when individuals classify people on the basis of 
their membership in various groupings. The most critical classifications are in-group (the 
group one belongs to) and outgroup (the group one does not belong to). Identification occurs 
when individuals take on the qualities and characteristics of the group to which they belong 
(see, for example, Turner et al., 1987). Typically, strong in-group identification is related to a 
low tolerance towards outgroup.  
A concept related to collective guilt and group identification is intergroup forgiveness or 
reconciliation. Forgiveness is typically defined as a response that forgoes negative emotions, 
thoughts and actions (like revenge) in the face of a transgression. Three common 
conceptualizations of forgiveness are presented on the basis of philosophical and 
psychological literature: (1) forgiveness supposes the replacement of negative emotions 
toward the offender by positive emotions; (2) forgiveness is a strictly dyadic process, 
involving only an offended and an offender who is known to the offender; and (3) forgiveness 
is not a process that devalues the forgiven person but a process that encourages him/her to 
behave better in the future (Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004).  
Mullet, Girard and Bakhshi (2004) investigated in their study of French families how 
people conceptualize forgiveness and do they share the same theoretical conceptions. The 
researchers also examined to what extent people differ in these respects. They called the first 
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conceptualization of forgiveness (replacement of negative emotions by positive ones) a 
“change of heart” process. Their study showed that approximately only one fifth of the 
respondents agreed on the notion that forgiving someone is a “change of heart” process. 
About one third were neutral and over 40 per cent of the respondents disagreed with the 
conceptualization. Concerning the conceptualization “forgiveness is a strictly dyadic process” 
the results indicated that most respondents conceptualized forgiveness as something more 
than a dyadic process. They gave high scores to items like “You can forgive the person 
responsible for an institution – the state, the church, an association – which have done you 
wrong”, and “You can forgive a person who has done you wrong even after the death of that 
person”. Only 25 per cent of the respondents thought that forgiving is only possible between a 
known offender and a known offended. Mullet et al (2004) concluded that based on this 
result, forgiveness is conceptualized as a process that involves a forgiver but not necessarily 
an offender, and that identities of the possible forgiver and the possible forgiven person are 
much broader than usually considered in the literature. The third conceptualization 
(forgiveness helps offenders to behave better in the future) was moderately supported by the 
respondents: 33 per cent of them agreed with the notion.  
Thus, based on (social) psychological research there seems to be divergent ideas of 
forgiveness among people and in some cases big individual differences. These might explain 
the different attitudes towards forgiving historical injustices, together with the group 
identification and moral emotions. 
Questions to a social psychologist from a history educator 
In the preceding chapter there are some concepts and perspectives the researchers in history 
education can find inspiring to relate to. For example, sensitivity and empathy are relevant 
concepts also in history teaching where ability to put oneself in an other person’s shoes in 
order to better understand his/her intentions as an historical actor is considered important. It is 
called ’historical empathy’, and it has a cognitive and an affective dimension. (Endacott & 
Brooks, 2013.) One of the aims in history teaching is to develop students’ historical empathy, 
thus there is a notion of a hierarchy of levels of historical empathy, albeit it may often remain 
untheorised. In the previous chapter it is argued that moral sensitivity requires ability to take 
the other’s viewpoint and this includes also being aware of “what might be the consequences 
of different behaviours to different parties”. These are in fact aims that also history educators 
consider central in developing students’ historical thinking and historical empathy (see, for 
example, Portal, 1987; Harris & Foreman-Peck, 2004; Davis, Yeager, & Foster (eds), 2001). 
The intriguing question is how the social-psychological theories of moral sensitivity could 
support conceptually more refined interpretations of historical empathy and its development. 
The previous chapter notes: “Collective guilt is an emotion that arises mainly when group 
members perceive that they have some responsibility for, or control over, their in-group’s 
wrongdoings or the possible consequences of those wrongdoings”. If some person, contrary to 
what could be reasonably expected, does not feel collective guilt, it might then be related to 
how the person perceives his/her in-group or how he/she perceives that the morally bad thing 
in the past was not caused by volitional acts, for example. Both perceptions were visible in the 
Finnish focus groups. The perception where the crucial point is the mental demarcation of the 
in-group is probably usually more interesting to a researcher of historical consciousness. In 
the framework of the social-psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral 
consciousness, does it make a difference which one of these two perceptions weighs more in 
the person’s mind? 
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Two further questions come to an history educator’s mind when reading the previous 
chapter: Does it make a difference from a social psychological point of view whether the 
moral emotion in question is (collective) guilt or shame, and whether this emotion is 
’vicarious’ or due to the feeling of not having done enough to repair some historical injustice? 
What can be said about the case M26 in the excerpt above in this view?  
The previous chapter also discusses the results of a study on how people conceive the 
notion of forgiveness. How do the results of that (quantitative) study match with the 
(qualitative) observations on Finnish upper secondary school students’ reasoning on historical 
responsibility? For example, let us consider the following points.  
1) “Forgiveness supposes the replacement of negative emotions toward the offender by 
positive emotions.” In the study only one fifth of the respondents agreed with the notion that 
the process of forgiving entails some kind of “change of heart”. Also the students in the focus 
groups were sceptical about there being any deeper sentiments involved in forgiveness. In 
their reasoning the act of forgiving (and apologizing for) historical wrongs may rather have 
social benefits because the meaning of the act of forgiving is that it is a constructive 
perlocutionary speech act more than an outcome of some moral conviction. Does this suggest 
a lacking moral sensitivity or historical empathy, and can this be ’assessed’ with some 
reference point? 
2) Only 25 per cent of the respondents in the research on French families thought that 
forgiving can only be possible between a known offender and a known offended. The students 
in the focus groups were sceptical about the meaning of symbolic reparation between persons 
who are not part of the ’original’ victim–perpetrator dyad. What bothered them was the idea 
that perpetrators’ or victims’ descendants would speak on behalf of their forefathers. Is it an 
indication of well developed role-taking capability that one can also think of other actors than 
original victims and perpetrators as moral stake-holders in an historical reparation processes?   
3) In the study of French families (only) one third of the respondents considered that 
forgiveness may encourage people to behave morally better in the future. Do social-
psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral motivation suggest that such an effect 
exists? There is a long tradition where history, understood as knowledge about the past, is 
assumed to provide people with moral guidance (historia magistra vitae), however in Jörn 
Rüsen’s typology of historical narratives exemplary narratives are, implicitly, not typical of 
the most sophisticated mode of historical consciousness. If one is predisposed to think that 
forgiveness can move people towards morally better conduct, does it then also witness of 
ability to reconsider and reinterpret the past in the light of present and future expectations? 
A social-psychological response to a history educator 
Above, Löfström is intrigued to know if, and how, the social-psychological theories of moral 
sensitivity could support conceptually more elaborated interpretations of historical empathy 
and its various ’levels’. Conceptually, moral sensitivity requires role-taking and empathy 
which form its cognitive and affective aspects (Rest, 1986). Feelings of empathy are 
presumed to alert an individual to the moral relevance of the situation (Pizarro, 2000). 
According to Eisenberg (2000), pure empathy – that is, an affective response to an other’s 
emotional state or condition that is similar to what the other person is feeling or is expected to 
feel (see, for example, Eisenberg et al., 1994) – is not other-oriented, but by cognitive 
processing it can turn into sympathy, personal distress or a combination of the two. Thus, 
empathy, sympathy and personal distress are regarded as divergent emotional experiences 
although all three require some level of cognitive processing. Hoffman (2000) has proposed 
that empathy develops through five levels from the newborn reactive cry to empathic distress 
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beyond the situation. In the latter, a person recognizes that others have feelings beyond the 
immediate situation and this mental representation of the other’s plight leads him/her to feel 
empathic distress for others. Extensive body of research has supported the developmental path 
of empathy at the early years of life, although also stable individual differences in children’s 
concern for others over time have been found (Hastings, Zahn-Waxler, & McShane, 2006). 
To feel mature empathy – or sympathy in Eisenberg’s terms – requires then a certain level of 
cognitive development. Cognitive role-taking (putting oneself in the other’s place and 
imagining how she or he feels), however, is distinct from empathy-related reactions because it 
lacks emotionality (see, for example, Eisenberg & Morris, 2001), yet it can enable individuals 
to bypass empathic arousal and bias (Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000).  
In terms of collective guilt, Löfström asks if feeling collective guilt is more related to in-
group-outgroup categorization or the transgression being volitional or not, and does it make a 
difference in the context of a social-psychological study? Both factors play a role in moral 
sensitivity. Recent research shows that we are prone to a greater moral sensitivity for in-group 
than outgroup victims, in particular if the perpetrator is from an out-group. (Molenberghs et 
al., 2014). In-group members’ wrongdoings are perhaps not so easy to perceive as immoral. 
Forgiveness seems also to be negatively related to an in-group identity but positively to a 
common in-group identity – by finding some superordinate category, which includes both the 
conflicting groups (Noor et al., 2008). In addition, intensity of the moral issue affects how 
sensitive people are to transgressions, i.e. how salient and vivid the action is (Sparks, 2015). It 
might be that human beings perceive in-group’s behavior as less immoral because they do not 
think their transgressions are so salient.  
Löfström continues to question if it makes a difference from the social psychological point 
of view whether the moral emotion in question is (collective, transgenerational) guilt or 
shame and whether this emotion is ’vicarious’ or due to feelings of not having done enough to 
repair the historical injustice? What can we say about case M26 in the focus group? Guilt and 
shame are both labelled as self-conscious emotions, that is, they involve self-evaluation of the 
self. Guilt arises from feeling responsible of unwanted consequences. It focuses on specific 
behaviors, something that the person her/himself has done or – as in collective guilt – 
members of his/her in-group have done, or on the possible consequences of the transgression. 
In shame the focus is on others’ reactions: the ashamed person is concerned with others’ 
evaluation of his/her self rather than the acts’ effect on others, as in guilt. Guilt typically 
motivates desire to confess, apologize or repair whereas shame gives rise to desire to hide, 
escape or strike back, i.e. behave aggressively. (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Silfver-Kuhalampi 
et al., 2013.) Yet shame and guilt can co-occur so it is possible at the same time to feel 
ashamed and guilty. In a study of university students’ guilt and shame narratives, Silfver-
Kuhalampi (2007) found that reparative behavior was as likely in the situations where both 
guilt and shame were reported as in the “guilt alone” situations. Pure shame, on the other 
hand, was less likely to motivate reparative behavior. Thus it could be argued that in the focus 
group above M26 felt both shame and guilt, and his talking about apology refers to a desire to 
repair the wrongdoings somehow. 
Concerning forgiveness, it seems that the students in the focus groups were doubtful of the 
“change of heart” forgiveness and they rather spoke of the social benefits of forgiving (and 
apologizing for) historical wrongs. Does this show a lack of moral sensitivity or historical 
empathy, and can this be assessed somehow? If we think of Rest’s (1986) definition, moral 
sensitivity involves constructing different possible scenarios for the situation and imagining 
how different actions might influence the participants in the situation. Moral judgment then 
could be based on the pros and cons of different actions. Whether focusing on the “change of 
heart” forgiveness or rather on constructive consequences of forgiveness may then only 
indicate that the person is emphasizing different aspects of the situation. However, act of 
Analysing adolescents’ reasoning about historical responsibility in dialogue between history education and social 
psychology 
 
77 
forgiving could be an adaptive coping strategy to manage the painful emotions (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980) and to reduce hostility (Silton, Flannelly, & Lutjen, 2013). 
Further it was asked if is it a sign of developed role-taking capability that one can go 
beyond the dyad victim–perpetrator and apologize or forgive for other ’moral share-holders’, 
not only those immediately present in the dyad? As mentioned above, both mature empathy 
and mature guilt requires cognitive development, the ability to form mental representations. 
We can take the perspective of the other and feel sympathy for others even beyond the 
immediate situation and for fictional characters; research shows that reading narrative fiction 
can enhance sympathy among adolescents (Sklar, 2013). Hence, due to mature guilt and 
empathy we are able to apologize or forgive on behalf of actors not being among us anymore.  
Lastly it was asked if the social-psychological studies of moral sensitivity and moral 
motivation show that forgiveness encourages people to behave better in the future. In general, 
factors of moral motivation, like sympathy and guilt, have shown positive relationship to 
prosocial behavior (see, for example, Davis et al., 1999), and they can be enhanced (e.g Sklar 
2013). Research has also shown that for example in the context of Northern Irish conflict 
forgiveness predicts reconciliation intentions (Noor et al., 2008). Hence, we can assume that 
forgiveness has positive influence on future behavior. 
Concluding remarks: what elements to add in future focus groups? 
Considering the perspectives opened here by Liisa Myyry it is worthwhile to ponder what 
elements would be important to add in the discussion topics in the focus groups where people 
are asked to ponder on issues of historical responsibility and reparation? Firstly, Myyry draws 
attention to the importance of the in-group–outgroup distinction in how people make moral 
judgments on acts and their outcomes partly depending on how they see the involved actors as 
part of one’s in-group or outgroup. In the Finnish focus groups in 2008–2009 the students 
were posed questions that were intended to spark discussion that would shed light on this 
theme. For example, they were asked how they find the idea of being part in a chain of 
generations that binds ’the Finnish people’ in the present and in the past together? The 
students were also asked to how much they feel that the Finnish Prime Minister’s public 
apology in the name of ”all Finnish people” for the deportation of exiles during WW II 
obliged them personally. In the future it could be worthwhile to pose more questions – and 
more provocative questions – that would make interviewees reflect if they see the boundaries 
between their in-group and outgroups as stable or changeable in morally particularly sensitive 
historical cases. 
Secondly, regarding relations between feelings of shame and guilt, Myyry refers to a study 
of university students’ guilt and shame narratives and how the two modes of narratives are 
likely to coincide or not with reparative behaviours. In the focus groups feelings of guilt and 
shame were addressed directly in the question to which episodes in Finnish history the 
students felt proud or ashamed. They were also asked how they find the idea that the 
developing countries should get reparation for the colonial period from the colonizing 
Western countries. This is a question related to the in-group/out-group dilemma too, but it 
was more geared towards generating discussion that might show whether there were feelings 
of transgenerational guilt or shame among the students. Also here it could be useful in future 
focus groups to pose more direct questions to the specific issues for students, or possibly, of 
which, they could be collectively ashamed of or feel guilty of, and, in case such feelings 
appear familiar and conceivable to them, “what do they think might be the driving forces or 
the ‘causes’ behind them?”. 
Analysing adolescents’ reasoning about historical responsibility in dialogue between history education and social 
psychology 
 
78 
Lastly, Liisa Myyry discussed the variety of ideas on forgiveness and how the variety may 
explain differential attitudes toward the notion of forgiving past injustices. In the focus groups 
the topic of historical forgiveness was addressed when asking what the students think of 
historical injustices being officially forgiven and whether someone might have ’absolved’ the 
Finnish people after the Finnish Prime Minister’s apology. In future focus groups it could be 
valuable to discuss more how the interviewees see that forgiveness may entail changes at an 
emotional level on the part of the forgiver and what effects forgiveness may have in 
encouraging the forgiven part to morally better conduct in the future, for example. 
Understandably the variety of relevant topics for one focus group discussion is too wide if 
the discussion is to be kept within reasonable limits. The crucial question is which theoretical 
and conceptual foci to choose that could fruitfully connect issues that are relevant for the 
study of historical as well as moral consciousness. This also intertwines closely with the 
question of what could be the most promising tools that enable a crossdisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary analysis of empirical material like the focus groups above. At this point we 
are in the beginning of our way in looking for answers. 
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